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ABSTRACT: This paper aims to develop a comprehensive framework to analyze the spatiotemporal 
vulnerability of railway systems assessed by passengers delay under disruptions and the framework 
integrates the time-related attributes of disruptions, railway system, and heterogeneous train flows. In the 
framework, the modeling of the railway system involves a two-layer network structure consisting of 
physical layer and service layer. The proposed framework introduces the concept of component damage 
scenario to represent the post-disruption state of railway component. Combination of the component 
damage scenarios can represent the system damage status under any kinds of disruptions. This study 
applies the proposed framework to the Chinese high-speed railway system and analyzes its 
spatiotemporal vulnerability under two types of disruptions: individual station failure and spatially 
localized failures. The finding of this study facilitate the design of system maintenance strategies to 
mitigate system vulnerability under various disruptions. 
 
Railway is one of the most important 
transportation modes all over the world. However, 
railway systems are often affected by various 
disruptions which cause great loss to welfare of 
the modern societies, not only damaging the 
railway physical infrastructures, but also 
compromising the system service level for the 
passengers [1]. Hence, the problems on how to 
better protect railway systems have attracted 
growing attentions from governments and 
researchers in recent years. 
These problems relate to a variety of 
measures, such as risk, vulnerability, reliability, 
robustness, flexibility, survivability, and 
resilience, addressed for the three stages 
mentioned above. Among these measures, 
vulnerability, robustness and resilience are 
frequently used to analyze, evaluate, and mitigate 
the disruption impacts in the context of railway 
systems [2]. Although the definitions of these 
measures vary in the literature, many researchers 
agree that, vulnerability and robustness mainly 
concern the first two stages in the disaster 
management process, while resilience deals with 
the whole three stages and emphasizes the last one 
- recovery.  
System recovery problems emphasize the 
time-related attributes from the system and 
disruption perspectives [3]. For example, 
resilience-focused studies facilitate the system “to 
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recover quickly after a shock” or “to recover 
within an acceptable time” that acquires time-
related attributes involved in the modeling [4]. 
Time-related attributes are also important to the 
first two stages, as well as to system vulnerability 
or robustness analysis. For the railway system, the 
time-related attributes, such as disruption 
occurrence time and duration, the trains’ timetable 
are all important factors for system disaster 
management, which are seldom discussed in 
previous studies [5]. Hence, as an initial step to 
integrate time-related attributes into consideration, 
this paper aims at developing a framework to 
analyze the spatiotemporal vulnerability of 
railway system, in which the system vulnerability 
is assessed by total passengers delay under 
disruptions. Not only the time-related attributes of 
disruptions (occurrence time and duration), but 
also of railway system and passengers, are 
integrated into the framework.  
1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
System vulnerability assessment depends on 
two essential factors: the system performance 
metric and the disruption mode. Different 
performance metrics and disruption modes may 
lead to diverse results of vulnerability analysis.  
We divide the performance metrics of 
railway system into two categories: the metrics 
based on the characteristics of railway system and 
the metrics based on the service of railway system 
that provided to the passengers. Many scholars 
modeled the railway system as a network of nodes 
connected by links to better represent the 
topological and geographical information of 
railway physical infrastructures [6]. Then, the 
network topological metrics are naturally used to 
measure the performance of railway system, such 
as average degree and betweenness, shortest path 
length, network efficiency, size of the giant 
components and connectivity. But, the research 
results based on topological metrics may be 
difficult to be implemented in reality and provide 
useful recommendations to the stakeholders or 
governments [7]. Other scholars used flow-based 
metrics to assess railway system performance. 
Sun et al. [8] considered passenger flow 
redistribution in the vulnerability analysis of a rail 
transit network. Jiang et al. [9] proposed a station-
based accessibility to measure the performance of 
a rail transit network, in which the accessibility 
metric addressed the passenger flow and land use 
characteristics simultaneously.  
Instead of using the characteristics of railway 
systems, other studies analyze the service quality 
of railway systems to assess systems’ 
performance from the perspective of passengers, 
for instance, the number of canceled trains or 
delay of passengers. Pieter et al. used the number 
of canceled trains as the performance metric to 
analyze the railway systems’ vulnerability caused 
by planned maintenance interventions [10]. Fikar 
et al. used the average disruption delay time 
(ADDT) and the total disruption delay time 
(TDDT) [11]. 
In system vulnerability assessment, the other 
essential prerequisite is disruption modes. 
Different kinds of disruptive events can lead to 
diverse vulnerability analysis results. Railway 
systems can be affected by many kinds of 
disruptions caused by technical failures and man-
made faults, terroristic attacks, extreme weather 
events, natural disasters, failure of climate-change 
mitigation, and cyberattacks. Zhang et al. 
analyzed the vulnerability of high speed railway 
systems in three counties and the Shanghai 
subway system under random failures and degree- 
and betweenness-based intentional attacks [12]. 
Chang and Nojima [13] introduced a method to 
analyze the post-disaster performance of the 
railway system under earthquake scenarios. Hong 
et al. analyzed the vulnerability of the Chinese 
railway system under floods [14] and earthquakes 
[15]. From the above discussion, we find that 
many spatial features of disruptions are included 
in the vulnerability analysis of railway system, 
such as the locations of railway components and 
disruptions, the distribution intensity distribution; 
however, little attention has been paid to the time-
related attributes of disruptions, such as 
occurrence time and duration. The time-related 
attributes of disruptions, railway system and 
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passengers should be integrate into the passenger 
delay calculation and further the vulnerability 
analysis of railway system.  
To address these issues, this study seeks to assess 
the railway system vulnerability by taking into 
account time-related attributes of disruptions, 
railway system and passengers. The overall 
objective is to develop a more comprehensive 
framework to analyze the vulnerability of railway 
system, not only in the dimension of space but 
also in the dimension of time. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
2.1. The two-layer network model 
𝐺 = {(𝑉, 𝐸), (𝑉, 𝐿), 𝑇,𝑀}  is used to represent a 
railway system. A directed network (𝑉, 𝐸) 
represents the physical layer of railway system, 
where the node set 𝑉 = {𝑣𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑘𝑣  denotes the 
railway stations, the edge set 𝐸 = {𝑒𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑘𝑒  denotes 
the railway tracks, and 𝑘𝑣  and 𝑘𝑒  represent the 
number of stations and tracks in 𝐺, respectively. 
Each edge in E connects two stations in V. Two 
railway tracks with different directions 
connecting the same station pair are represented 
as two different edges in E. A directed network 
(𝑉, 𝐿)  represents the service layer of railway 
system, the link set 𝐿 = {𝑙𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑘𝑙 , 𝑘𝑙 represents the 
number of links in 𝐺 . If two stations in V are 
served by a train without stops in between, there 
will be a link in L to connect these two stations in 
the service layer, and the link has the same 
direction of the train. 𝑇 = {𝑡𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑘𝑡  denotes the 
train set, and 𝑘𝑡 represents the number of trains in 
𝐺 . The route of a train can be specified by a 
sequence of adjacent links in L from the origin 
station to the destination station in the service 
layer, or a sequence of adjacent edges in the 
physical layer. Hence, a train is represented 
as 𝑡𝑖 = {𝑉𝑖, 𝐸𝑖, 𝐿𝑖 , 𝑆𝑖, 𝑃𝑖}, 𝑉𝑖, 𝐸𝑖, and 𝐿𝑖 denote the 
station set, the edge set and the link set in the route 





, 𝐸𝑖 ⊂ 𝐸 , 𝑒𝑖
𝑗
 denotes the 
jth edge in the route of train 𝑡𝑖 , 𝑘𝑖
𝑒  denotes the 






, 𝐿𝑖 ⊂ 𝐿, 𝑙𝑖
𝑗
 denotes the jth link in the route 
of train 𝑡𝑖, 𝑘𝑖
𝑙 denotes the total number of links in 
the route of train 𝑡𝑖, 𝑘𝑖
𝑒 ≥ 𝑘𝑖
𝑙, the equality holds 
when train 𝑡𝑖 stops at all the stations in its route in 








the arrival and departure time set of train 𝑡𝑖 on its 




 denote the 
departure time and the arrival time on edge 𝑒𝑖
𝑗
 of 







equality holds when train 𝑡𝑖  doesn’t stop at the 




. 𝑃𝑖  is used to 
record the passengers flow in each station in the 












 denote the number of boarding 
passengers on at the origin station and the number 
of alighting passengers at the destination station 
on link 𝑙𝑖
𝑗
 of train 𝑡𝑖 , respectively. In the train 
model 𝑡𝑖 = {𝑉𝑖, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝐿𝑖, 𝑆𝑖, 𝑃𝑖}, 𝑉𝑖  and 𝐸𝑖  is used to 
determine whether train 𝑡𝑖  is affected by a 
disruption, 𝑆𝑖  is used to identify the location of 
train 𝑡𝑖  when a disruption occurs, 𝐿𝑖  and 𝑃𝑖  is 
used to calculate the number of delayed 
passengers of train 𝑡𝑖 after a disruption. M is used 
to record the relationships among railway stations, 
edges, links, 𝑀 = {((𝑣𝑥, 𝑒y), (𝑣𝑥, 𝑙z), (𝑒y, 𝑙z))} , 
where 𝑣𝑥 ∈ 𝑉, 𝑒y ∈ 𝐸, 𝑙z ∈ 𝐿, 𝑥 ∈ {1,2,3, … , 𝑘𝑣}, 
y ∈ {1,2,3, … , 𝑘𝑒}, z ∈ {1,2,3, … , 𝑘𝑙}. If 𝑣𝑥 is the 
origin station of railway track 𝑒𝑦, (𝑣𝑥, 𝑒y) = 1; if 
𝑣𝑥 is the destination station of 𝑒y, (𝑣𝑥, 𝑒y) = 2; 
otherwise, (𝑣𝑥, 𝑒y) = 0. If 𝑣𝑥 is the origin station 
of link 𝑙z , (𝑣𝑥, 𝑙z) = 1; if 𝑣𝑥  is the destination 
station of 𝑙z , (𝑣𝑥, 𝑙z) = 2; otherwise, (𝑣𝑥, 𝑙z) =
0. If a railway track 𝑒y is a part of 𝑙z (with the 
same direction), (𝑒y, 𝑙z) = 1 ; otherwise, 
(𝑒𝑦, 𝑙z) = 0. 
2.2. Component damage scenarios 
Studies on vulnerability analysis of railway 
system have seldom involved the time-related 
attributes of disruptions, such as the disruption 
occurrence time and duration. To incorporate the 
time-related attributes of disruptions into 
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vulnerability analysis of railway system, this 
section introduces a concept of component 
damage scenario, which is used to record the 
damage to railway components caused by 
disruptions, including component damage level, 
component damage occurrence time and 
component damage duration. The damage 
statuses of railway infrastructure caused by 
different disruptions can all be represented by the 
combinations of component damage scenarios. 
The component damage scenarios set under a 









where 𝜂  denote the disruption; 𝑐𝜂
𝑗
 denotes a 
component damage scenario of component j due 
to disruption  𝜂 , 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑘𝑣 + 𝑘𝑒] is the index of 
railway components, when 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑘𝑣] , the 
damaged component is a railway station in V, and 
when 𝑗 ∈ [𝑘𝑣 + 1, 𝑘𝑣 + 𝑘𝑒] , the damaged 
component is a railway track in E; 𝑞𝜂
𝑗
 denotes the 
damage level of component j under disruption 𝜂, 
and the value of 𝑞𝜂
𝑗
 can have binary value {0, 1}, 





denotes the component damage occurrence time; 
𝑦𝜂
𝑗
 denotes the damage duration. 
2.3. Spatiotemporal vulnerability 
analysis 
2.3.1. Delay of affected trains under disruption 
The delay of an affected train under a 
disruption is calculated based on the delay of this 
train under each corresponding component 
damage scenario caused by the disruption. Let 
𝐷𝜂
𝑇 = {𝑑𝜂
𝑖 }  represent the delay time set of all 
affected trains under disruption 𝜂, 𝑑𝜂
𝑖  denote the 
delay of an affected train 𝑡𝑖. The three steps listed 
below investigate whether train 𝑡𝑖 is affected by 
disruption 𝜂 and how long it will be delayed. 
Step 1: Identify affected trains;  
     Step 1.1: Choose a train 𝑡𝑖 in T.  
Step 1.2: Choose a component damage 
scenario 𝑐𝜂
𝑗
 in 𝐶𝜂. If component j belongs to {𝐸𝑖 ∪
𝑉𝑖}, then this damaged component is in the route 




      Step 1.3: Repeat Step 1.2 for all the 
component damage scenarios in 𝐶𝜂 . Let 𝐶𝜂
𝑖  
denote the component damage scenario set which 
may affect train 𝑡𝑖. 
      Step 1.4: Repeat Step 1.1 to Step 1.3 for 
all trains in T. Let 𝑇𝜂 denote the train set which 
may be affected by disruption 𝜂, 𝑇𝜂 ⊆ 𝑇.  
Step 2: Determine the delay of all affected 
trains in 𝑇𝜂 under disruption 𝜂.  
     Step 2.1: Choose an train 𝑡𝑖 in 𝑇𝜂.  
Step 2.2: Choose a scenario 𝑐𝜂
𝑗
 in 𝐶𝜂
𝑖 .  
Here, we use 𝑒𝑖
δ, δ ∈ [1, 𝑘𝑖
𝑒] to locate the 
damaged component, and 𝑒𝑖
γ
, γ ∈ [1, 𝑘𝑖
𝑒]  to 
locate the position of the affected train when the 
disruption occurs. 𝑒𝑖





 is determined based on the 
component damage occurrence time 𝑥𝜂
𝑗
 and the 
departure and arrival time of train 𝑡𝑖 in each edge 






) means train 
𝑡𝑖  is in an edge 𝑒𝑖
γ







], then train 𝑡𝑖 is in a 
station which is the destination station of edge 𝑒𝑖
γ
 
when component damage occurs.  
According to the locations of an affected 
train 𝑡𝑖 and the damaged component, there are six 
different situations, and the delay under each of 
these situations are calculated respectively: 
(1)The damaged component is a station (a node in 
𝑉𝑖 ) and train 𝑡
𝑖  is exactly in that station when 















(2) The damaged component is a station and it is 
in front of train 𝑡𝑖 when the damage occurs, and 
when train 𝑡𝑖  arrives at this damaged station it 
hasn’t been recovered yet. The location of the 
damaged station is identified by the destination 
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station of edge 𝑒𝑖

















(3) There are two cases that train 𝑡𝑖  will not be 





δ2 , which means 
the damaged station will be recovered before train 




, which means 
that when the station damage occurs, train 𝑡𝑖 has 
already passed it. In these two cases, 𝑑
𝑐𝜂
𝑗
𝑖 = 0. 
(4) The damaged component is a track (an edge 
in 𝐸𝑖) and train 𝑡
𝑖 is exactly in that damaged 











(5) The damaged component is a track and it is in 
front of train 𝑡𝑖  when the damage occurs, and 
when train 𝑡𝑖  arrives at this damaged track it 

















(6) There are two cases that train 𝑡𝑖  will not be 





δ1 , which means 
the damaged track will be recovered before train 
𝑡𝑖  arrives; II. γ > δ , 𝑠𝑖
δ2 ≤ 𝑥𝜂
𝑗
, which means 
when the track damage occurs, train 𝑡𝑖  has 
already passed it. In these two cases, 𝑑
𝑐𝜂
𝑗
𝑖 = 0. 
Step 2.3: Repeat Step 2.2, and determine 
the delay of train 𝑡𝑖  under each of those related 
component damage scenarios in 𝐶𝜂
𝑖 . 
Step 2.4: Repeat Step 2.1 - Step 2.3 for all 
the trains in 𝑇𝜂 , and determine the delay of all 
affected trains under all the related component 
damage scenarios.  
Step 3: Determine the delay of all affected 
trains under disruption 𝜂.  
The delay of a train 𝑡𝑖 under a disruption 
𝜂  equals to the maxima of its delay under all 






𝑖 }, and the maxima delay corresponding 







𝑖 .  
Then the delay of all affected trains 𝐷𝜂
𝑇 can 
be abtained by checking the delay of all the affect 
trains under all related component damage 
scenarios. 
2.3.2. Delayed passenger flows 
The number of delayed passengers of an 
affected train will be calculated in three different 
situations.   
(1) The train 𝑡𝑖  is exactly in a railway 
component (a station or a track) which is damaged 
under scenario 𝑐𝜂
𝑖∗ , this means γ = δ. According 
to the relationship of railway tracks (in E) and 
links (in L) stored in the matrix M, the 
corresponding link to edge 𝑒𝑖




δ′) = 1  in M, δ′ ∈ {1,2,3,… , 𝑘𝑖
𝑙} , 
𝑒𝑖
δ ∈ 𝐸𝑖 , 𝑙𝑖
δ′ ∈ 𝐿𝑖 . The total number of delayed 
passengers of train 𝑡𝑖 equals to the number of all 
passengers who will alight at the following 
stations in the remained route of train 𝑡𝑖  after 







 is the number of passengers who will 
alight at the destination station of link 𝑙𝑖
𝛽
, 𝛽 ∈
{δ′, δ′ + 1,… , 𝑘𝑖
𝑙}, 𝑝𝑖
𝛽2
∈ 𝑃𝑖.  
(2) The damaged railway station is in front of 
train 𝑡𝑖 when the component damage scenario 𝑐𝜂
𝑖∗  















δ′) = 1 in M.  
(3) The damage railway track is in front of 
train 𝑡𝑖 when the component damage scenario 𝑐𝜂
𝑖∗  













Hence, in all the above three situations, the 
number of delayed passenger of train 𝑡𝑖  can be 





2.3.3. Vulnerability analysis 
The passenger delay of an affected train 𝑡𝑖 
under disruption 𝜂 can be calculated based on the 
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delay of each affected train and the number of 
delayed passengers in these trains:  
𝑑𝜂
































𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑖
δ 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑; 



















𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 𝑒𝑖















δ 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑. ) 
𝟎, (𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒)
  
Then, the spatiotemporal vulnerability of 
railway system under disruption 𝜂 , which is 
assessed by the total delay of passengers in all 
affected trains, is calculated as:  
𝑉𝑢𝑙𝜂 = ∑ (𝑑𝜂






This paper considers two kinds of disruptions: the 
individual railway station failure and the worst-
case spatially localized failures. For the individual 
station failure, each time a railway station is 
chosen as the damaged component, then the total 
passengers’ delay under disruption scenarios with 
different disruption occurrence time and durations 
will be calculated respectively. The railway 
system spatiotemporal vulnerability caused by 
this station failure is assessed by the average 
passengers’ delay under all these disruption 
scenarios with different disruption occurrence 
time and durations. Further, this paper analyzes 
the spatiotemporal vulnerability of railway system 
under spatially localized failures (SLFs). The 
vulnerability of the Chinese railway system under 
three kinds of SLFs have been studied in the 
authors’ previous study [16], and this paper will 
analyze the railway system spatiotemporal 
vulnerability under one of SLFs, circle-shaped 
spatially localized failures (CSSLFs), with the 
consideration of disruption occurrence time and 
duration.  
3. CASE STUDY 
This section applies the proposed spatiotemporal 
vulnerability analysis framework to the Chinese 
high-speed railway system (CHRS) that is the 
most popular long-distance travel mode in China. 
In CHRS, 𝑘𝑣 =  337, 𝑘𝑒 =  370, 𝑘𝑙 =  30117, 
𝑘𝑡 = 5694. 
For each individual station failure, we 
categorize 24 disruption occurrence time from 1 
o’clock to 24 o’clock and 12 disruption durations 
{0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.25, 2.5, 
2.75 and 3} hours. This means, there are 288 
scenarios for each individual station failure, and 
the system vulnerability caused by a damaged 
station is the average vulnerability under all these 
288 scenarios. 
 
Fig. 1 the spatiotemporal vulnerability of CHRS under 
individual station failure with different disruption 
occurrence time and duration. 
Fig. 1 shows the vulnerability of CHRS caused by 
the individual station failure at different 
disruption occurrence time and durations, where 
the system vulnerability is the average value of 
each individual railway station failure with a 
certain damage occurrence time and duration. For 
the CHRS, if the disruption occurrence time is 
between 8 o’clock to 17 o’clock, the disruption 
can cause larger system vulnerability than other 
time points. This result can be shown more clearly 
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vulnerability at each of 24 time points. Fig. 6 
shows that when the disruption duration is small, 
the vulnerability of CHRS are all very small, and 
with the increasing of disruption duration, the 
system vulnerability increase sharply. 
 
Fig. 2 The railway system vulnerability under 
individual station failure: (a) based on disruption 
occurrence time; (b) based on disruption duration. 
For the CSSLFs, the circle radii of CSSLFs range 
from 25 to 300 km with a step of 25 km. Similar, 
the spatiotemporal vulnerability of railway system 
under a certain disruption radius of CSSLF is the 
average system vulnerability under these 288 
scenarios. 
 
Fig. 3 The dispersion degree of centers under different 
radii of CSSLFs 
 
Fig. 4 The railway system vulnerability under CSSLFs 
 
For each of the 288 scenarios with certain 
disruption occurrence time and duration, there 
will be a critical center for each radius. This 
means, there are 288 critical centers for each 
disruption radius with different disruption 
occurrence time and duration, in each of the three 
railway systems. We find that with the increase of 
disruption radius, the distances between these 
critical centers become smaller and smaller. We 
call the sum of the distances between these critical 
centers for each disruption radius as the dispersion 
degree of these centers. Fig. 3 shows that with the 
increase of disruption radius, the dispersion 
degree of centers in CHRS merely changes.  
Fig. 4 shows the largest and average 
spatiotemporal vulnerability of CHRS under 
different radius of CSSLF. With the increase of 
radius, the largest and average vulnerability both 
increase smoothly. Note that the results in Fig. 4 
are different with our previous work in [57], 
where the largest vulnerability has a sharp 
increase when the radius of CSSLF changes from 
100 km to 140 km. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes a comprehensive framework 
to analyze the spatiotemporal vulnerability of 
railway systems with the consideration of time-
related attributes of disruption, railway system, 
and heterogeneous train flows. The framework 
includes a two-layer network model of railway 
system, a new concept called component damage 
scenario to capture the damage results in the 
physical infrastructure of railway system, the 
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methods to calculate the delay of affected trains 
and the number of delayed passengers in each of 
the affected trains. This study proposes a method 
consisting of three steps to calculate the delay of 
the affect trains under related component damage 
scenarios. Based on the method, the 
spatiotemporal vulnerability of railway system is 
assessed by the total passengers’ delay under 
disruptions. The spatiotemporal vulnerbility 
analysis results is helpful to identify the critical 
railway stations, design valuable system 
maintenance strategies and mitigate system 
vulnerability under disruptions. Meanwhile, the 
proposed framework can be easily adapted to 
analyze other schedule-based transportation 
systems’ vulnerability, such as subway, bus, 
airline, shipping and so on. 
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